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Abstract:  The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes 
when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is 
fulfilled, the high compliance however observed remains a puzzle. In this paper, we investigate 
the role of emotions as a possible explanation of tax compliance. Our laboratory experiment 
shows that emotional arousal, measured by Skin Conductance Responses, increases in the 
proportion of evaded taxes. The perspective of punishment after an audit, especially when the 
pictures of the evaders are publicly displayed, also raises emotions. We show that an audit policy 
that induces shame on the evaders favors compliance. 
 
Résumé: Les modèles économiques d'évasion fiscale prédisent que les individus devraient 
frauder dès que le bénéfice attendu de l'évasion dépasse son coût espéré. Sous cette condition, le 
fort taux de revenu déclaré pourtant observé constitue une énigme.  Dans cet article, nous nous 
intéressons au rôle des émotions comme explication possible de ce phénomène. Notre expérience 
de laboratoire montre que l'intensité des émotions, mesurée par la conductance de la peau, 
augmente avec la proportion du revenu qui n'est pas déclarée. La perspective d'une sanction à 
l'issue d'un contrôle, en particulier lorsque la photo des contrevenants est diffusée, soulève 
également des émotions. Nous montrons qu'une politique de contrôle qui suscite la honte chez les 
fraudeurs favorise l'honnêteté fiscale. 
 
 
Keywords: Tax evasion, emotions, neuro-economics, physiological measures, shame, 
experiments.  
Mots-clés: Fraude fiscale, émotions, neuro-économie, mesures physiologiques, honte, 
expériences.  
 
JEL Codes: C91, C92, D87, H26 
 
* CNRS, Centre des Neurosciences Cognitives, 67, boulevard Pinel 69675 Bron Cedex, France. E-mail: 
coricelli@isc.cnrs.fr  
# CNRS, Centre des Neurosciences Cognitives, 67, boulevard Pinel 69675 Bron Cedex, France. E-mail: 
joffily@isc.cnrs.fr
§ CIRANO, University of Montreal, 2020 rue University, Montreal (Quebec), Canada, H3A 2A5. E-mail: 
Claude.Montmarquette@cirano.qc.ca
◊ University of Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE, 93, Chemin de Mouilles Ecully, F-69130, 
France; IZA, Bonn, D-53113, Germany. E-mail : villeval@gate.cnrs.fr
 
The authors are grateful to participants at the ESA World Meeting in Rome, at the Workshop on Risk 
Attitude in Montpellier, and at seminars at the University of Aarhus and at the University of Copenhagen, 
for their comments.  We thank R. Zeiliger for programming the experiment. This research was supported 
by a grant from the Rhône-Alpes Region (CIBLE program). 
 
 1
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tax evasion is a substantial phenomenon. According to the analyses of the 
National Research Program, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2006) estimates that 
the 2001 Federal tax-underreporting gap represents $345 billions, i.e. about 16.3% of the 
tax liability in the United States (Slemrod, 2007). The importance of tax evasion is 
comparable in most high-income OECD countries. Understanding the reasons why 
individuals evade taxes and how to increase compliance is therefore extremely 
challenging. 
The standard economics-of-crime model formulated by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
and Yitzhaki (1974) has inspired many empirical tests (see Alm (1991), Cowell (1990), 
Elffers (1991), Andreoni et al. (1998), and Slemrod (2007) for surveys).  If they confirm 
the basic mechanisms of the deterrence models, these tests however reveal more 
compliance than predicted1. This has motivated the exploration of other dimensions of 
tax compliance, like tax morale, ethics, and social norms (see Torgler (2002)).2 Civic 
norms (Slemrod (1998)), moral appeals (Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Blumenthal et al. 
(2001), Torgler (2004)), or expectation of collective blame (Bosco and Mittone (1997)) 
have been shown to exert contrasted influence on tax compliance without, however, fully 
explaining it. 
                                                 
1 Also relaxing the hypothesis of risk neutrality, thus assuming risk aversion, does not help to explain the 
level of compliance observed in empirical settings (Bayer and Sutter (2004)). 
2 Another perspective explores the heuristics and biases that lead individuals to overweight small audit 
probabilities (Alm et al. (1992)).  Another one consists of the analysis of equity and the role of voting on 
the use of taxes in compliance behavior (Pommerehne et al. (1994)).  The role of social interactions has 
been investigated more recently (Myles and Naylor (1996); Fortin et al. (2007)). 
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In this paper, we investigate a new hypothesis by considering that our understanding of 
tax compliance can be improved by analyzing the role of emotions.  Our expectation is 
that both income reporting and audit, possibly followed by sanctions, elicit emotions in 
individuals. We assume that emotions do not simply proxy the psychic cost of evading 
taxes; moreover, they constitute a driving force of behavior.  In other words, the emotions 
associated with reporting, audit, and sanctions can influence further compliance. Our 
analysis is inspired by the recent developments of neuroeconomics. With emotions being 
functional in driving preferences and decisions (Zajonc (1980); Coricelli, Dolan and 
Sirigu (2007)), rational decision-making cannot be dissociated from emotions (Damasio 
(1994)). Closely related to this paper, Harbaugh et al. (2007) have recently shown that 
mandatory taxation for a charitable cause entails neural activity in brain areas of the 
ventral striatum that are related to individualistic rewards.  This suggests that in some 
contexts, tax compliance can produce satisfaction for the taxpayer.  We extend this 
reflection by considering situations where no charity is involved and where the 
individuals can evade taxes. 
Different emotions might be related with the act of evading taxes and its consequences.  
Underreporting income might generate anticipatory and anticipated emotions 
(Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber and Welch (2001)).3  Thus, the evader might experience 
intense feelings (i.e., anticipatory emotions) when taking the risky choice of reporting 
less than requested.  We expect these risk-related anticipatory emotions to increase in the 
                                                 
3 As defined by Lowenstein et al. (2001): “Anticipatory emotions are immediate visceral reactions to risks 
and uncertainties. Anticipated emotions are typically not experienced in the immediate present but are 
expected to be experienced in the future…anticipated emotions are a component of the expected 
consequences of a decision: they are emotions that are expected to occur when outcomes are experienced, 
rather than emotions that are experienced at the time of decision [i.e., anticipatory emotions]” (pp. 268).  
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level of tax evasion.  Moreover, the evader might anticipate how bad he will feel if 
audited and punished (i.e., anticipated emotions).  We also expect that the intensity of the 
emotions related to the detection of cheating differs according to the publicity of this 
information.  Indeed, different events can generate various emotions according to the 
cognitive appraisal theory of emotions (Frijda (1986); Lazarus (1991)).4  For instance, 
evaders can feel regret and guilt even when the information is not spread out and their 
reputation remains intact in the future. 5   They can feel shame and embarrassment if their 
cheating behavior is made public.   This is at least what is expected by the authorities that 
resort to the public exposure of the offenders.6  Since it is difficult to cope with a 
damaged reputation, we expect the “social” emotion of shame to have a larger impact on 
future choice behavior than its “private” counterpart (i.e., guilt).7  Thus, shame 
avoidance, in addition to guilt avoidance, is likely to increase tax compliance.  
To test these hypotheses, we have run a laboratory experiment in which subjects receive 
an exogenous income that is taxed at a proportional tax rate, and whose emotional arousal 
                                                 
4 According to the appraisal theory (Frijda (1986)) emotions are concern-activated response patterns that 
depend on the cognitive evaluation of the context.  For instance, a loss is a loss if a person feels it as a loss.  
The stimuli that elicit emotional responses are the ones that are relevant for the satisfaction of the 
individual’s concerns (desired states or event).  At a low cognitive level (primary appraisal), the intensity 
of the emotion increases in the importance of the concern and with the simultaneous presence of multiple 
concerns.  At a higher cognitive level (secondary appraisal), the intensity and the nature of the emotions 
are primarily context-dependent.  At this level, emotions are strongly related to the difficulty of the context, 
and mainly to the evaluation of our capacity to deal with the situation. Emotions are adaptive in that they 
prepare the organism for change in action tendency.  
5 Interestingly, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) explicitly mention that tax evasion may be limited if the 
individuals fear losing their reputation.  
6 While pillories have been historically used in many cultures, the web provides nowadays many examples 
of such policies. For example, the Chicago police department displays the pictures and home addresses of 
prostitute patrons arrested by the police; a listing of convicted pedophiles is available in every state in the 
U.S.A.; the government of Canada displays the names of citizens convicted of fiscal fraud; etc.   
7 For instance, appraised uncontrollability (secondary appraisal) of dealing with a public announcement of 
a cheating behavior intensifies the effects of the already negative emotion of guilt. This is because the 
social group effect may appraise the situation as more difficult to change. Similar amplification effect 
(Kahneman and Miller (1986)), when moving from a private to a social context, has been found in a recent 
paper by Bault et al. (2007). In this paper, the social emotions of envy and gloating are found to be more 
intense and to have a deeper behavioral effect than their private counterparts (regret and relief). 
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is measured.  Each individual has to decide how much income he is willing to report.  He 
faces a probability to be audited, in which case he must pay a penalty for underreporting.  
This audit probability is endogenous and depends on the median of reported incomes in 
the group of taxpayers.  We compare behavior in two treatments.  In contrast with the 
Benchmark treatment, in the Picture treatment any individual’s cheating behavior is 
publicly revealed through the public display of his picture.  
To measure the emotional arousal associated with the decisions and the feedback on 
audits, we use Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) (Bradley et al (2000)).  The SCR is a 
phasic component of the electrodermal activity (EDA) primarily controlled by the 
sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) (Dawson et al, 2000). We 
also use affective self-reports to assess the emotional arousal (low-high intensity) and the 
hedonic valence (pleasant-unpleasant) dimensions of emotion as a robustness check 
(Russell and Mehrabian (1977)).  
Beyond the hypotheses under examination, an originality of our approach lies in the fact 
that our physiological measures are not only related to individual decisions but also to 
social interactions in the Picture treatment.  To our knowledge, this is the first economic 
experiment that measures SCRs in a group of several interacting subjects.   
Our experiment delivers several major findings.  Although it is rational to evade taxes in 
our environment, the subjects express increased SCRs both when underreporting their 
income and when being audited.  Indeed, the emotional arousal rises in the intensity of 
tax evasion.  Emotional arousal is increased by the perspective of monetary sanctions 
and, even more by the perspective of additional non-monetary sanctions.  As a 
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consequence, being in an environment where the picture of the detected evader is 
publicly displayed favors tax compliance.  An interpretation is that people try to avoid the 
shame associated with detection.  Last, the reporting decision time increases in the level 
of evasion and in the intensity of emotions.  This suggests that the subjects need time to 
solve the tension between the rationality of evading and the associated psychic cost.  
Interestingly, these results show that, despite the sterility of the environment, it is 
possible to capture emotions and the fear of social stigma in the lab. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the experimental 
design and the predictions.  Section 3 analyzes the results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. THE EXPERIMENT 
A. Experimental design 
 The experiment consists of two treatments. The Benchmark treatment is 
characterized as follows.  The experimental game involves a group of 8 players who 
receive an individual income. The income can take the following values: 
.  Each income level is randomly assigned to two subjects in each 
period, but this is not common information.  The players are requested to pay a tax on 
their income.  The uniform tax rate applied to the reported income is 55%.  To satisfy this 
request, the players must report their income that will be taxed.
I ∈ 50,100,150,200{ }
                                                
8  For the sake of 
simplicity and also to produce a stronger test of the social emotions, we do not introduce 
any public good dimension.  The subjects are told that these paybacks will go into 
scientific research funds. 
 
8 The subject reports an income by means of a scrollbar of which maximum graduation corresponds to the 
subject's actual income. Therefore, a subject cannot report more than his actual income.  
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The players know that their reported income can be audited according to a certain cutoff 
audit scheme and that this audit will entail the payment of a fine if the reported income is 
less than the actual income.  We have reinforced the experimental realism of the design 
not only by replicating the structure of income reporting, but also by using non-neutral 
terms in the instructions (see Appendix) and by introducing an endogenous audit rule.  
The probability of an audit is endogenous in that it depends on the median report in the 
group, and this is made common information.9  If the reported income of a player is 
among the four highest reported incomes in the group, his audit probability is 35%.  If his 
reported income is among the four lowest reported incomes in the group, his audit 
probability is 65%.  If all subjects report the same amount, the audit probability is 
uniform and equal to 50%.   The reason why low reported income players have a higher 
probability of being audited is because reporting low incomes signals to the tax authority, 
which knows the distribution of income that the individual might have underreported by a 
substantial amount.  The tax authority has little to gain in auditing individuals who report 
a high income as auditing is costly.10  Therefore, the subjects do not know their 
individual audit probability (for an early attempt to study the impact of uncertain audit 
probabilities on compliance, see Spicer and Thomas (1982)).  
The payoffs are determined as follows.  If the player is not audited, his payoff consists of 
his net income (i.e. his income minus the tax on his reported income).  If the player is 
                                                 
9 In real settings, the probability of an audit depends on the taxpayer's decisions since reports convey 
information.  While empirical analyses are plagued by such an endogeneity problem (Alm (1991)), 
experiments allow clearing it up by using random audit probabilities.  Most experiments however do not  
try to analyze how tax authorities use information from returns to determine audit and how endogenous 
probabilities influence decisions.  Exceptions are Collins and Plumlee (1991), Alm et al. (2000).  
10 We could also have allocated audit probabilities as a function of past detected evasion behavior.  This 
would have increased the realism of the experiment, but it would also have increased the complexity of the 
game and made the results less comparable with the existing literature. 
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audited and he has underreported his income, he has to pay the tax on his actual income 
and a fine is charged.  As in the Yitzhaki (1974) deterrence model, the fine is 
proportional to the unpaid taxes and it is fixed at 20%, which is a realistic value 
(Andreoni et al. (1998)).  
The Picture treatment follows the same timing as the Benchmark treatment: the players 
receive their income; they report an income; they are informed on whether they have 
been audited; then, the payoffs for the period are computed.  In contrast with the 
Benchmark treatment however, if an audit reveals that a player has underreported his 
income, the picture of the contravener is displayed on his own screen and on the screen of 
other taxpayers.  In a period, only one picture can be displayed on the screen of any 
subject; if more than one tax evader has been audited, there is a random display of each 
picture on the screen of the non-audited subjects and the honest audited taxpayers.11 The 
extent of evasion is not displayed since it could be an additional source of influence on 
individual decisions. This treatment helps in identifying whether evading taxes involves 
social emotions, such as shame.  Indeed, if the compliance rate differs from that in the 
Benchmark treatment, this can only be attributable to the flow of information sent to 
other subjects about one’s cheating behavior and received about other subjects’ cheating 
behavior.   
To identify more precisely the treatment effects, we used a within-subject design to 
control that the subjects’ characteristics are held constant.  The experimental session 
consists of 30 periods, divided into six blocks of 5 periods.  The Benchmark treatment is 
                                                 
11 Displaying only one picture at a time does not allow the subjects to identify precisely the number of 
evaders in the session.  This also means that a subject who is caught cheating does not know if there were 
other tax evaders and how many subjects can see his picture. 
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implemented in periods 1 to 5, 11 to 15, 21 to 25, and the Picture treatment is 
implemented in the remaining periods.  The type of treatment in the current period is 
always kept visible at the top of the subjects’ screens.   
Each period is segmented into four or five events, depending on the treatment type, as 
follows: i. Decision – this event starts when the subject is informed about his income for 
the current period and ends when the subject makes his decision (self-paced); ii. 
Feedback on audit – the subject is informed on whether an audit has been conducted and 
if the audit led to the payment of a fine (fixed duration of 12 s); iii. Picture display 
(Picture treatment only) – the picture of an audited contravener is displayed (fixed 
duration of 6.5 s); if the audit did not identify any under-reporting, this event is skipped; 
iv. Feedback on payoffs – the payoff for the period is displayed (fixed duration of 3 s); v. 
Affective self-report – the subject reports his feeling at the end of the period (self-paced).  
B. Predictions with selfish and rational agents 
The theoretical predictions are the same for both treatments if we assume that 
players are rational.  We also assume that the players are risk-neutral: the utility function 
of the participants is linear in income.  We consider a game in the vein of Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974). I denotes the subject’s gross income, which 
expected value is 0.25(50+100+150+200) = 125.  For the symmetry of the game, we can 
assume that each player believes that the other players receive the same income with 
equal probability.  The probability to be audited, assuming that each player uses the same 
strategy and reports the same income, is p = 0.5*ALow + 0.5*AHigh.  ALow is the audit rate 
for those reporting income below the median and AHigh is the audit rate for income 
reported above the median. 
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Let t be the tax rate and f be the penalty rate.  If an individual decides to report an amount 
R of his gross income I, his net expected income, ENI, is:  
                ( ) ( )( ) ( )1I p t I R ft I R t p R ENI⎡ ⎤− − + − + − =⎣ ⎦                 (1) 
The term between the square brackets is the expected value of the tax t and the fine (f 
times the unpaid taxes) associated with this strategy.  If an individual chooses to report 
his full income, then his net income, NI, is simply: 
I − tI = NI       (2) 
The expected rate of return from reporting no income (R=0 in equation (1)) relatively to 
reporting all his income is:  
                               
( ) ( )( )1 10
1
t p fENI with R NI
NI t
− + += − = −       (3) 
With the following parameters, t = 55%, f = 20%, ALow = 65% and AHigh = 35% (therefore 
p=50%), this expected rate of return is 45%.  This is a strong incentive not to report any 
income to the tax authority and full reporting is always a dominated strategy.  Indeed, the 
return of evasion increases in absolute terms in the level of income; in addition, a subject 
may realize that it is easier to hide evasion when one receives a high income if he 
believes that other subjects have drawn a lower income. 
This game has however no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies because a player has an 
incentive to deviate by reporting one unit more than the other players to reduce his own 
audit probability from 50% to 35%.  The solution of the game is indeed a mixed strategy 
equilibrium with a positive compliance rate.  Under the assumption of risk neutrality, one 
can suspect that this compliance rate is very low, due to the high expected return from 
each evaded unit of income even under the high audit probability. 
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C. Predictions with emotional agents 
In addition to risk aversion, anticipatory and anticipated emotions can favor 
higher tax compliance.  Indeed, emotional players may comply because they suffer a 
psychic cost in evading or when being caught cheating.  For their part, the non-emotional 
players, if they expect the presence of emotional players in the group, may expect to bear 
the highest audit probability and therefore, should also report more.  For these two 
reasons, the mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of emotional players is likely to 
predict a higher compliance rate.   
In our experiment, the parameters of the game are the same for both treatments and for 
each level of reported income; risk related anticipatory emotions should also be similar.  
Therefore, the level of reporting in the presence of psychic costs should be similar in both 
treatments.  The only reason why the subjects might change behavior between treatments 
is shame avoidance.  Indeed, we expect a lower probability to underreport in the Picture 
treatment in order to avoid the feeling of shame or embarrassment if audited.  Such 
anticipated emotions should therefore be the main determinants of the treatment effects 
on decisions and on the pattern of SCRs.  
D. Experimental procedures 
The experiment consisted of six sessions.  These sessions were conducted at the 
Groupe d’Analyse et de Theorie Economique (GATE), at the University of Lyon, France.  
48 subjects (of which 63% were males), 8 for each session, were recruited from 
undergraduate courses in the local business and engineering schools. Some of the 
subjects had participated in previous experiments, but all of the subjects were 
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inexperienced in this particular type of experiment. The experiment was computerized 
using the REGATE program developed at GATE (Zeiliger (2000)).   
Upon arrival and before entering the laboratory, the subjects drew a tag indicating their 
designated computer.  Then, we asked them whether they allowed us to take a picture of 
their face (all have accepted).  It was made explicit that this picture would be used at 
some point during the experiment, that they would be informed before the possible use of 
the pictures, and that they could quit immediately against the payment of the show-up 
fee.  The subjects received also the guarantee that their picture would be immediately 
destroyed at the end of the session.  The volunteers were required to keep a neutral face 
when we took their picture.  Next, each subject was allowed to seat in front of his 
computer.  The instructions for the preliminary part of the experiment were then 
distributed and read aloud.  After the completion of a test of risk attitudes, the 
instructions for the other parts were distributed and read aloud.  For the sake of realism, 
the instructions used tax specific language, but they made no reference to the measure of 
emotions.12  We checked the understanding of the rules of the game by means of a 
questionnaire.  We also answered the subjects’ questions in private.   
Eliciting risk preferences. Since there are good reasons to believe that risk attitude 
influences the individual compliance decision, we implemented in the preliminary part of 
the experiment a parsimonious procedure to elicit each individual’s degree of risk 
aversion. This test was taken from Charness and Gneezy (2003).  Each subject was 
                                                 
12 Alm (1991) mentions that by using loaded terms, the experimenter loses some control over the subjects' 
preferences; on the other hand, it helps introducing context, which is important in explaining compliance 
behavior, and make mental scripts less necessary.  Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) compare two 
experiments using either loaded or neutral wording and find no difference in behavior. 
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endowed with 15 points (his show-up fee of €3) and was presented with a one-shot 
decision.  He had to decide how much of this endowment to invest in a risky asset and 
how much to keep. There is an even chance for the investment to be a success or a 
failure. In case it fails, the amount invested is lost; in case of a success, the investment 
returns 2.5 times its amount.  Each subject had also to choose one of two colors. If this 
color is randomly drawn (with a 50% chance), the investment is a success.  Since the 
lottery gives an expected return of 1.25 point for each point invested, a risk-neutral 
subject should invest his full endowment. The lower the amount invested in the risky 
asset, the higher the degree of risk aversion.  While the subjects chose the amount of their 
investment and their color at the beginning of the session, the random draw was made 
only at the end of the session in order not to influence behavior in the main game. 
The "Physionomics lab".   We proceeded to the simultaneous electrophysiological 
recording of a group of 8 interactive subjects.  Experimental sessions took place in a 
noiseless room with stable temperature set to 21o C.  Skin conductance activity was 
recoded with a BIOPAC MP150W system and two TEL100C telemetry modules 
(BIOPAC Systems, EU). Two Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with 0.5% saline in a neutral 
base paste were placed on the subject’s distal phalanges of the middle and the index 
fingers of the non-dominant hand, after the attachment site had been cleaned with a 
neutral soap (Dawson et al (2000)).  A constant voltage of 0.5V was applied between the 
electrodes.  The skin conductance signal was amplified (x2000) and low-pass filtered 
(30Hz) before being sampled at 125Hz.  Skin conductance activity was continuously 
recorded until the end of the session  
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Skin conductance data analysis. Skin conductance signal was low-pass filtered at 0.5Hz 
offline, using a 5th order Butterworth low-pass digital filter.  SCRs’ onset and peak were 
automatically detected, when the first derivative of the filtered signal changed sign, by a 
program written in Matlab (The MathWorks Inc., EU).  The detection of an accelerative 
deflection, during the onset and peak period (SCR’s rise time), indicated a SCR 
overlapping.  In the case of overlapping, the two SCRs were i) split, if they could be 
related to different events (according to criteria described below), or ii) summed together 
(see Boucsein (1992), p.136).  The whole signal was visually inspected prior to further 
analysis and false SCR detections were removed.  The SCR amplitude was calculated as 
the difference between the signal amplitude at the peak and the onset times.  The SCR 
amplitude was thresholded at 0.02 µS (Dawson et al (2000)).  Skin conductance 
responses were analyzed for the decision, the feedback on audit and the feedback on 
payoffs events, only.13  Skin conductance responses with onset between 0.7 and 3.7 s, 
after the beginning of an audit or payoff, were assumed specific to the event.  With 
respect to the decision event, given its self-paced duration, specific SCRs were allowed 
onset time from 0.7 s after the subject is informed on his income, until the subject’s 
decision.  In order to minimize SCRs overlapping between events, we imposed a 
minimum time interval of 6 seconds between adjacent events.   
Affective self-reports.  At the end of each period, the subjects had to report their feelings 
at the moment of the audit by means of two 7-point Likert-type scales of emotional 
arousal (from extremely weak to extremely strong) and hedonic valence (from extremely 
negative to extremely positive).  These affective self-reports were aimed at a consistency 
                                                 
13 The analysis of the SCRs related to the feedback on payoffs is not reported here because it does not bring 
more information than the analysis of the SCRs related to decision and audit.  
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check with the physiological measures.  The physiological measures provide an 
autonomic measure of the subject’s emotion; while the affective self-reports unveil, 
backwardly, the subjective emotional experience.  An adequate assessment of emotions 
requires an integration of behavior, verbal-report and physiology (Bradley and Lang, 
2001).  A positive correlation between physiological and self-report measures is 
expected.  They should however be considered complementary rather than redundant 
measurement since they do not necessarily convey exactly the same information. 
At the end of the session, once the 30 periods were completed, the subjects had to report 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale their feelings (from extremely negative to extremely 
positive) regarding three types of frauds.14  This attitudinal survey aimed at analyzing the 
consistency of reporting behavior in the laboratory with the attitude towards fraud in 
various real contexts.  Next, the subjects had to click a button to draw the color that 
determined whether the investment they made in the preliminary part of the experiment 
was a success or not.  Then, they completed a demographic questionnaire and they were 
allowed to leave the laboratory.  
On average, a session lasted 75 minutes including preparation of the subjects for the 
physiological recording and including cash payment in private in a separate room.  The 
subjects were informed from the beginning of the session that a person who is not aware 
of the content of the experiment would pay them.15  Payment consisted of the average 
earnings in two randomly selected periods out of 30 in order to avoid possible 
                                                 
14 A question focused on tax evasion by a shopkeeper who receives payment in cash. The second question 
was related to an individual who use public transportation without buying a ticket.  The last scenario was 
related to a driver who does not respect the Highway Code. 
15 Indeed, it was important to avoid that some subjects worry that they might not get invited back for more 
experiments if the experimenter knew that they cheated.  Similarly, it was made knowledge that all 
decisions were anonymous. 
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accumulated wealth effects. The subjects received a show-up fee of 3€. On average, they 
earned €19.33. 
 
3. RESULTS 
An overview of our experimental results is that we find substantial treatment 
effects on the reporting decision, as an environment where evading behavior is made 
public reduces the proportion of evaders.  The results show that evading taxes raise 
emotions and that punishment, especially when it is made public, reinforces emotional 
responses and their behavioral consequences.  We first provide descriptive statistics on 
individuals’ behavior.   We then consider the determinants of such behavior, providing 
regression analysis. 
A. Summary statistics and non-parametric analysis 
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 Benchmark 
treatment 
Picture  
Treatment 
All treatments 
Proportion of reported income 
when income is 50 
when income is 100 
when income is 150 
when income is 200 
Proportion of evaders 
when income is 50 
when income is 100 
when income is 150 
when income is 200 
Proportion of punished subjects 
Amount of taxes 
Amount of fines 
Payoffs 
Emotions:  SCR–decision in µSiemens 
Non evaders 
Evaders 
Emotions: SCR – audit in µSiemens 
Non evaders 
           Evaders 
Decision time in seconds 
Non evaders 
           Evaders 
Self-reported emotional arousal: from 1 
(extremely weak) to 7 (extremely strong) 
           Non evaders 
           Evaders 
Self-reported hedonic valence: from 1 
(extremely negative) to 7 (extremely 
positive) 
            Non evaders 
            Evaders 
60.71 (34.32) 
64.27 (44.14) 
64.96 (33.00) 
58.75 (30.40) 
54.86 (26.49) 
78.06 (41.42) 
51.67 (50.11) 
76.67 (42.41) 
89.44 (30.81) 
94.44 (22.97) 
37.92 (48.55) 
55.11 (30.22) 
7.39 (5.55) 
67.08 (39.21) 
0.16 (0.27) 
0.09 (0 .17) 
0.18 (0.29) 
0.13 (0.27) 
0.05 (0.19) 
0.15 (0.28) 
12.68 (7.76) 
9.73 (5.92) 
13.51 (8.02) 
 
3.91 (1.70) 
3.15 (1.80) 
4.12 (1.61) 
 
 
3.97 (1.66) 
4.32 (1.32) 
3.87 (1.74) 
67.66 (34.02) 
70.41 (43.15) 
73.05 (34.73) 
68.48 (28.28) 
58.69 (25.73) 
67.22 (46.97) 
37.78 (48.62) 
56.11 (49.76) 
82.22 (38.34) 
92.78 (25.96) 
35.56 (47.90) 
58.18 (29.64) 
7.06 (5.38) 
64.31 (36.78) 
0.15 (0.25) 
0.09 (0 .22) 
0.17 (0.26) 
0.13 (0.25) 
0.04 (0.11) 
0.17 (0.29) 
10.42 (5.73) 
8.92 (5.57) 
11.15 (5.66) 
 
3.90 (1.81) 
3.08 (1.78) 
4.30 (1.69) 
 
 
3.94 (1.72) 
4.24 (1.32) 
3.80 (1.87) 
64.18 (34.34) 
67.34 (43.70) 
69.00 (34.07) 
63.61 (29.72) 
56.77 (26.15) 
72.64 (44.60) 
44.72 (49.79) 
66.39 (47.30) 
85.83 (34.92) 
93.61 (24.49) 
36.74 (48.23) 
56.65 (29.96) 
7.23 (5.46) 
65.70 (38.03) 
0.16 (0.26) 
0.09 (0.21) 
0.18 (0.27) 
0.13 (0.26) 
0.05 (0.15) 
0.16 (0.29) 
11.55 (6.91) 
9.25 (5.72) 
12.42 (7.12) 
 
3.90 (1.75) 
3.11 (1.79) 
4.20 (1.65) 
 
 
3.96 (1.69) 
4.27 (1.32) 
3.84 (1.80) 
Number of observations 
Proportion of males 
Average amount invested  
Percentage of negative sentiments regarding 
Shopkeepers evading taxes 
Contraveners with highway code 
Fare dodgers 
        720                           720                           1440 
62.50 (48.43) 
9.38 (3.58) 
  
54.17 (49.84) 
85.42 (35.31) 
50.00 (50.02) 
Note: The Table indicates average values; standard deviations in parentheses. 
Regarding the reporting behavior, Table 1 indicates three important elements.  First, the 
proportion of reported income declines in the level of income. This is confirmed by non-
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parametric statistics.16  The second result is that the reporting behavior is affected by the 
Picture treatment.  For each income level, the proportion of reported income is higher in 
an environment where underreporting may be made public (but the Mann-Whitney tests 
fail concluding on significant differences).  Figure 1 illustrates this result. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of reported income by treatment and by income level 
 
The proportion of evaders follows a similar pattern as the proportion of reported income, 
as illustrated by Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of evaders by treatment and by income level 
 
                                                 
16 In all the reported non-parametric tests, a session is considered as one independent observation.  
According to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, the average proportion of reported income is significantly lower 
at the 5% level when we compare individuals who receive an income of 200 with individuals who receive 
an income of 150 (p = 0.046), 100 (p = 0.028), and 50 (p = 0.046).  It is significantly lower at the 10% 
level, when we compare individuals who receive an income of 150 with individuals who receive an income 
of 100 (p = 0.075).  The average reported proportion is not significantly different when we consider 
incomes of 50 and 100. 
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Table 1 and Figure 2 show that the proportion of evaders increases with income (all pair-
wise comparisons indicate that the differences are significant at the 5% level)17 and that it 
is significantly lower in the Picture treatment (p = 0.078). 
t is 37.92% in the Benchmark 
treatment.  It is slightly lower in the Picture treatment (35.56%), but not significantly so 
(Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.10).  These proportions should be 50% if all participants had 
chosen the evasion strategy, but a t-test concludes that these proportions are significantly 
lower than 50% (p < 0.001).  Average taxes, fines and payoffs follow, as expected, the 
same pattern as the proportion of reported income. 
about emotions, as measured by Skin 
Conductance Responses.  SCR is described by its amplitude and is expressed in 
µSiemens.  First, the average SCR amplitude is significantly higher when people 
underreport than when they comply (Wilcoxon test: p = 0.028).  It is twice as high when 
related to the reporting decision and three times higher when related to the feedback on 
audit.  Indeed, we would expect non-evaders to be less emotionally aroused when 
receiving the feedback on audit since they do not risk any punishment.  This explains that 
the average response of all the subjects is higher in the decision phase than in the audit 
phase (Wilcoxon test: p = 0.046). 
 the proportion of reported income.  Figures 3a and 3b 
break down the SCR measures by proportion of reported income and by treatment.  
                                                
Third, the average proportion of participants being caugh
Table 1 delivers also three important observations 
Second, SCR is inversely related to
 
17 The Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the proportion of evaders when the income is 200 is significantly 
higher than when the income is 150 (p = 0.034), 100 (p = 0.028) and 50 (p = 0.028). This proportion when 
the income is 150 is significantly higher than when the income is 100 (p = 0.046) and 50 (p = 0.028). It is 
also significantly higher when the income is 100 than when it is 50 (p = 0.034). 
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Figures 3. SCR by proportion of reported income and by treatment  
 
Figures 3a and 3b show that at both repor ng and audit moments, emotional arousal 
increases w at for the 
subjects reporting between 26% and 75% of their income, the Picture treatment is more 
arousing than the other treatment (Mann-Whitney tests: p = 0.037 for the SCR measured 
at the time of decision, and p = 0.004 for the SCR measured at the time of audit).  In this 
treatment, when the subjects report a very low proportion (less than 26%), the SCR is not 
higher than when subjects report between 26 and 50% of their income (the difference is 
not significant, p > 0.10).  This may be due to a selection bias, i.e. a fraction of those 
people who almost report nothing in this environment are more likely to have no psychic 
cost in evading taxes.  This explains why the average SCRs, both at the time of decision 
and audit, do not differ much by treatment in Table 1, when we do not control for the 
proportion of reported income (Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the differences are not 
significant: p > 0.10). 
0
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a) SCR at the time of reporting   b) SCR at the time of audit 
ti
hen the proportion of reported income decreases.  They also reveal th
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Third, the level of SCR differs over time.  Figure 4 displays the evolution over time of 
the proportion of reported income and of the SCR amplitudes with respect to reporting 
decision and to audit. Periods 1 to 5, 11 to 15, and 21 to 25 correspond to the Benchmark 
treatment; the other sequences correspond to the Picture treatment.  
 
  
Figure 4. Evolution of the proportion of reported income and of the SCR amplitude 
related to reporting decision and to audit  
 
 
Figure 4 shows a specific pattern of SCR am litude at the beginning of the experiment.  
Both measures indicate  periods of the game. 
his contributes to level off the differences in average SCR across treatments.  Figure 4 
also indicates that at the beginning of each sequence of the Picture treatment, SCR is 
shifting upwards relatively to the last period of the previous sequence under the 
Benchmark treatment.  The proportion of reported income also increases when one 
switches to the Picture treatment.18  We can also observe that after a peak, the amplitude 
                                                
p
 the highest level of SCR in the first three
T
 
18 This increase in the first periods of the Picture treatment cannot be attributable to a pure restart effect 
since we do not observe such a peak when switching to the Benchmark treatment.  
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of SCRs in this treatment is not sustained and that the proportion of reported income 
decreases when one switches to the Benchmark treatment.   
B. Regression analysis 
It appears that there are su the individuals’ behavior across 
treatme
bstantial differences in 
nts.  We now turn to a regression analysis of the determinants of the observed 
behavior.  A difficulty is that the reporting behavior and the emotional arousal may be 
both endogenous.  To control for the potential endogeneity bias in the estimations, we use 
a two-step procedure.  We first estimate the determinants of the proportion of reported 
income.  The predicted proportion of reported income derived from this first regression is 
then introduced as an instrument in the next equations estimating the determinants of the 
SCR amplitude at the time of reporting and at the time of audit.  Table 2 presents the 
results of the random-effects Tobit regression of the proportion of reported income.  We 
use a Tobit model since in 11.93% of the observations, the subjects report a null income 
and in 27.95% of the observations, they report their income in full.  The significant 
ρ coefficient in the regression confirms the necessity of a panel model to allow for the 
bjects’ heterogeneity by including individual random effects. 
 
su
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Table 2.  Determinants of the proportion of reported income 
Dependent variable: 
Proportion of reported income 
Random-effects Tobit model 
 
Treatments Coefficient Std.-error 
Income 
Picture treatment 
Time trend 
Decision 
Decision time 
Sanction in the prev
he fine in the previous period 
 
tion 
versity education 
 Shopkeepers evading taxes 
veners with highway code 
0
-1.054** 
-1.021*** 
-15.638*** 
13.963*** 
-18.845*** 
0 -0.173*** 
11.232*** 
0.02
2.133 
time 
2
ious period 
Amount of t
Male 
Risk attitude
Business educa
Mother with uni
Loan for paying studies 
Negative opinion on: 
          
           Contra
           Fare dodgers 
Constant 
.112 0.137 
0.507 
0.027** 
6.019* 
-0.710** 
-12.659*** 
 
5.191* 
31.737*** 
11.159*** 
70.015*** 
0.014 
3.180 
0.346 
3.246 
0.353 
2.778 
2.733 
3.182 
 
3.009 
4.102 
2.722 
7.679 
Number of observations 
Nb of left censured observations (%) 
Nb of right censured observations (%) 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ 2  
Prob > χ 2  
ρ  
1392 
166 (11.93) 
389 (27.95) 
-4703.217 
394.900 
0.000 
   0.421** 
Note: *, **, and 
 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, a  respectively.  
le 2 confirms that the proportion of reported income
subject’s income level, its most important finding lies in ct of the treatment 
ariable.  Indeed, it shows that an environment where a subject’s tax evasion is made 
public through the public display of his picture favors tax compliance relative to an 
environment where a detected fraud is only punished by monetary sanctions.  Such an 
impact of the Picture treatment is all the more remarkable as there is no public good 
dimension in our tax game.  We can indeed expect that redistributing the product of taxes 
among the subjects would increase even further the impact of the perspective of non-
monetary sanctions.  A candidate explanation is the valence and the intensity of emotions 
raised by the perspective of such a non-monetary sanction.  Tax compliance is also 
n l,d 0.01 leve
If Tab   is inversely related to the 
 the impa
v
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marginally reinforced by a sanction in the previous period.  In contrast, it is negatively 
affected by the amount of the associated fine.  Individuals may attempt to regain a 
previous loss by evading more in the current period (see Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
for a possible explanation in terms of reference dependence).  
Interestingly, we also find that the extent of tax evasion is associated, although 
nonlinearly, with a longer decision time.  This complements the observation from Table 1 
that evaders take on average more time to make their decision than non-evaders (12.42 
Individual characteristics also influence tax compliance.  As usual in the experimental 
literature on tax evasion (Slemrod, 2007), we find that males report a lower proportion of 
their income than females.  Not surprisingly, risk attitude (captured by the amount 
seconds and 9.25 seconds, respectively).  This could be associated with the higher 
cognitive requirement involved by the decision to evade taxes if the subject tries to 
elaborate mixed strategies. 
invested in the risky asset in the preliminary part of the experiment) is associated with a 
lower proportion of reported income.19  A business education prepares the subjects to 
evade more, probably because these subjects are more used to calculate the return of a 
risky decision.  The literature has shown that the level of wealth influences tax 
compliance (Slemrod, 2007).  This is captured in our regression through the level of 
education of the subject’s mother and through the existence of a loan to pursue studies.20  
Results show that less wealthy subjects evade more, possibly because the financial 
                                                 
19 The average amount invested in the lottery is about 9 points out of a possible 15 points. It suggests a 
fairly high average level of risk aversion. Almost 19% of the subjects chose to invest all their points in the 
lottery and are considered the less risk averse participants. 
 
ll informed. 
20 Asking direct questions on individual resources does not constitute a better alternative since almost no
subject is working while studying.  Asking about the parents’ income is not better because some students 
are reluctant to report this information or are simply not we
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pressure is stronger than for the wealthier subjects.  Lastly, the regression shows that the 
subjects who consider negatively shopkeepers evading taxes, drivers contriving the 
Highway Code and fare dodgers, consistently report a higher proportion of their income 
relatively to the other subjects.  
After analyzing the determinants of the reporting decision, we next focus on the 
determinants of the physiological SCR amplitude, by means of random-effects Tobit 
SCR amplitude at the time of decision 
s Tobit model 
 
models, in connection with tax-paying behavior.  Table 3 reports the determinants of the 
SCR amplitude when subjects report their income and Table 4 the determinants of the 
SCR amplitude when receiving a feedback on audit.  In both tables, we include the 
predicted value of the proportion of reported income resulting from the previous 
regression as an instrument to control for potential endogeneity. 
Table 3.  Determinants of the SCR amplitude at the time of decision 
Dependent variable: Random-effect
Treatments Coefficient Std-error 
Proportion of reported income 
Picture treatme
Time t
Decision time 
Decision time 2
-0.011*** 
0.0
-0.006*** 
0.002 
nt 
rend 
Risk attitude 
Male 
Constant 
87*** 0.019 
0.001 
0.014*** 
-0.0001 
-0.001 
0.024 
0.560*** 
0.004 
0.0001 
0.005 
0.050 
0.168 
Number of obse
Nb of left censu
rvations 
red observations (%) 
d Log Likelihoo
Wald χ 2  
Prob > χ 2  
ρ  
1392 
509 (36.57) 
-477.120 
156.390 
0.000 
0.239** 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, an l, respectively.  
 
d 0.01 leve
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Table sh3 ows that the instrumented reported income affects negatively the emotional 
y take.   
oreover, the Picture treatment has a strong positive and significant effect on emotions: 
that the decline in the SCR amplitude is 
clearly visible at the beginning of the game. This phenomenon is typical of stimulus 
                                                
arousal.  Subjects who evade more are more aroused, probably due to the risk the
M
the subjects are more emotionally aroused when placed in an environment with both 
monetary and non-monetary sanctions relatively to an environment with monetary 
sanctions only.  
The time trend is negative and significant.  Thus, as the game evolves, a lower SCR 
amplitude is recorded.  Figure 4 has shown 
elicited SCRs and is known as SCR habituation.21  In addition, after a while, the subjects 
have seen several pictures on their screen and they may realize that it is not uncommon to 
underreport.  Therefore, we observe a phenomenon of habitation that does not necessarily 
mean an emotional disengagement, as shown below.  Indeed, emotional disengagement 
should motivate people to evade more over time, considering the expected return of 
evasion.  The proportion of reported income does not however change significantly over 
time (see Table 2).  Figure 4 even shows a slight increase in the proportion of reported 
income in the last 10 periods.  A possible interpretation is that the guilt and shame 
experienced in the early periods have a lasting effect on reporting behavior.  It must be 
however acknowledged that the effect of time may be somewhat blurred by the sequence 
of treatments over time.  
 
21 As described by Dawson et al. (2000), “habituation is a ubiquitous and adaptive phenomenon whereby 
subjects become less responsive to familiar and non-significant stimuli”.  In fact, SCR is expected to 
decline in amplitude and eventually disappear after the presentation of 2-8 similar trials, reappearing again 
after two or three periods of silent interval (Dawson et al. (2000)).  
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Table 2 has shown that the proportion of reported income decreases in the decision time.  
Table 3 indicates that, controlling for reported income, more time taken to make a 
 when the subject receives a feedback on audit. 
 
decision increases significantly the emotional arousal when deciding.  These two joint 
results may suggest that the subjects need time to solve a conflict between the expected 
payoff of underreporting and the social norm of non-cheating, and this raises stronger 
emotions.  Using different games, Rubinstein (2007) states that a higher decision time is 
correlated with a higher subject’s cognitive activity and less emotional decisions.  Our 
observations suggest a different interpretation.  A tension between rationality and norms 
rises more decision time and more anticipated emotions.  Last, Table 3 indicates that, 
controlling for tax compliance, there is no gender effect in the emotional arousal.  
Similarly, risk attitude influences the reporting decision, but not the emotional arousal 
conditional on this reporting. 
Table 4 displays the results of a random-effects Tobit regression in which the dependent 
variable is the SCR amplitude
Table 4.  Determinants of the SCR amplitude at the time of audit 
Dependent variable: 
SCR amplitude at the time of audit 
Random-effects Tobit model 
Treatments Coefficient Std-error 
Proportion of report
Time trend 
Sanctio
Sanctio
Risk attitude 
-0.006*** 
0.0
0.163*** 0.039 
ed income -0.013*** 0.003 
n 
n with own picture displayed 
Male 
Constant 
71** 
0.001 
0.033 
0.009 
0.014 
0.526*** 
0.008 
0.063 
0.188 
Number of observations 
Nb of left censured observations (%) 
d Log Likelihoo
Wald χ 2  
Prob > χ  2
ρ  
1392 
763 (54.81) 
-731.238 
100.90 
0.000 
0.153** 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, an l, respectively.  d 0.01 leve
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 The SC  aR mplitude consistently indicates that the emotional arousal still increases in the 
ing is 
 
regarding audit offer a robustne avioral analysis based on 
physio
degree of tax evasion when the subjects receive the feedback on audit.  A major find
related to the perspective of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions on emotions at 
the time of audit.  When a subject has been audited and learns that he will be fined, he 
shows a higher emotional arousal than a subject who is not audited or is audited but not 
sanctioned.  There is an additional and highly significant effect of the treatment: when the 
evader learns that his own picture is going to be disseminated, his emotional arousal 
further increases.  Since the display of the picture means that the subject’s decision to 
cheat is made public and that the subject may be recognized by the other players at the 
end of the session, it is reasonable to assume that these emotions are related to shame, 
whereas the emotions felt after an audit announcing a sanction in the Benchmark 
treatment are better associated with internally-oriented emotions, such as guilt or regret. 
C. A robustness check 
The affective self-reports that have been collected at the end of each period
ss check for our beh
logical measures.  Indeed, to some extent self-reports on emotional arousal should 
corroborate these measures.  In addition, since the SCR measures cannot indicate the 
direction of emotions, self-reports can help us in making reasonable suggestions.  Table 1 
has already shown that the average emotional arousal, measured on a scale from 1 
(extremely weak) to 7 (extremely strong), was higher for tax evaders (4.20) than for non-
evaders (3.11).  Similarly, evaders report less positive hedonic valence regarding the 
audit (3.84) than non-evaders (4.27), on a scale from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 
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(extremely positive).  Providing a better-controlled analysis, Table 5 presents random-
effects GLS models of affective self-reports, in which we include the same explanatory 
variables as in Tables 3 and 4.  The first column estimates the determinants of the self-
reported emotional arousal; the second column aims at explaining the hedonic valence of 
these emotions. 
Table 5.  Determinants of the level of affective self-reports 
(Random-effects GLS models) 
 
onic valence Emotional arousal Hed 
Coefficient Std-error Coefficient Std.-error 
Proportion of reported income 
Time trend 
Sanction  
Sanction with own picture displayed 
Risk attitude 
-0.109*** 
0.020*** 
0.3
0.009 
0.004 
97 
-0.044*** 
-0.001 
-2.454
7.346*** 
0.008 
0.004 
91 
Male 
Constant 
42*** 
59*** 
0.0
0.10.4
0.111** 
-1.386*** 
9.106*** 
18 
0.045 
0.340 
0.703 
*** 
4 
0.0
0.10.14
0.006 
-0.305* 
10 
0.019 
0.158 
0.499 
Number of observations 
2Wald χ  
Prob > χ 2  
R2
1392 
  231.79 
.000 
0.024 
1392 
1139.42 
0.000 
0.434 
  0
  
 
Note: **, *, and *** indicate statistical significan 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, y. The 
al arousal variable is coded from 1 (extrem  to 7 (extremely high). The ence 
 is ded from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 (e  positive). 
                                                
ce at the respectivel
emotion
variable co
ely low) hedonic val
xtremely
 
This robustness check supports most of the previous results reported in Table 4.  With 
respect to the influence of evading taxes and subsequent sanctions, the first column of 
Table 5 shows similar results for the affective self-reports than for the physiological 
measures at the time of audit.22  In contrast to the SCR analysis however, the intensity of 
affective self-reports does not decline over time.  This suggests that the phenomenon of 
habituation that we observed above plays an important role on modulating the SCR 
amplitude although the experienced emotional arousal increases over time.  In addition, 
 
22 In addition, the simple correlation coefficient between the SCR amplitude at the time of the audit and the 
self-reported emotional arousal is significant and equal to 0.54. 
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the second column of Table 5 indicates that, controlling for sanctions, evasion is 
associated with more positive emotions at the time of the audit.  This could be caused by 
relief when an evader is not audited and by the associated perspective of higher payoffs.  
Not surprisingly, the subjects report more negative emotions when they are sanctioned, 
with no specific effect of the picture dissemination.   
If these regressions broadly support our SCR-based analysis and improve our 
understanding of the direction of emotions, they also confirm that here, the SCR 
4. CONCLUSION 
The deterrence models of tax evasion have recently been extended to include moral 
considerations.  This paper explores a complementary avenue by testing the hypothesis 
Our base design uses a tax game in which the players have to report their income and in 
which the individual audit probability depends on the position relative to the median of 
reported incomes.  Skin Conductance Responses provide a physiological measure of the 
measures and the self-reported emotions are more complement than substitutes.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that , due to their subjective nature, self-reports may be 
biased. For example, males self-report less arousing emotions than females, whereas the 
SCR-analysis concludes to the absence of significant difference by gender.  Physiological 
measures, uncontrolled by the subjects, are potentially more reliable than self-reported 
measures. 
 
that evading taxes generates emotions in the evaders.  For example, the non-respect of 
civic duty may generate guilt when the fraud is detected; and public information on the 
cheating behavior of the evader may generate shame and embarrassment.  
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emotional arousal that is uncontrolled by the individuals and thus, less subject to 
declarative biases.  Our approach is original in three respects.  First, we explore a new 
hypothesis, i.e. the role of emotions in tax compliance.  Second, we are able to 
differentiate the impact of monetary vs. non-monetary sanctions on emotions by means of 
an additional treatment in which the picture of deterred tax evaders is publicly displayed.  
This helps in identifying the role of anticipatory (risk-related) and anticipated emotions.  
Third, we have studied physiological measures of emotions for several individuals 
interacting in a group.  
Our results are striking.  The subjects evade less after having been punished and when 
they are in an environment when monetary and non-monetary sanctions are present 
together.  We show that the relationship between punishment and compliance is mediated 
There are reasons for caution in extrapolating these results. In particular, students may 
not be representative of taxpayers.  One can however be relatively confident in the 
external validity of these results because if one observes that emotions arise even with 
by emotions.  Emotions are elicited both at the moment of reporting and when subjects 
receive a feedback on their report's audit.  Emotional arousal increases in the intensity of 
tax evasion and in the perspective of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions.  The 
strong impact of the public display of the evaders' pictures on the emotional arousal is 
interpreted in terms of shame.  There is a disutility of being identified as a cheater in a 
group although rationality justifies tax evasion and although the subjects learn over time 
that there are other evaders in the group.    
small monetary stakes in the lab, they should be even greater when a yearly income is at 
stake in actual reporting decisions.   Keeping these limitations in mind, one can however 
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derive three main implications of these results.  First, they suggest that tax compliance 
may be guided by the willingness to avoid experiencing negative emotions raised by a 
potential detection.  Second, the reporting decision is likely to result from the solution of 
a tension in the individual's mind between the expected monetary reward of tax evasion 
that motivates underreporting, and its expected moral cost that motivates compliance.  
Solving this tension is cognitively demanding and this could explain why we find a 
positive correlation between the decision time, the emotional arousal and the importance 
of evasion.  This supports modeling strategies that include the psychic costs of evading in 
the taxpayer's utility function in interaction with its expected monetary payoff.  A third 
implication of our results is a policy perspective.  Indeed, income reporting increases 
when non-monetary sanctions are at risk, because the evaders who bear such sanctions 
experience negative social emotions.  Therefore, a policy threatening to denounce 
cheaters publicly might contribute to reduce fiscal fraud. 
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APPENDIX. Instructions 
We thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making designed by researchers 
from the University of Montreal, the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and the GATE research 
institute at the University of Lyon. This experiment consists of several independent parts.  During 
these parts, all transactions are expressed in points, with  
100 points = 20 Euro 
We will first distribute the rules for the preliminary part; the instructions for the next parts will be 
distributed later.  
Instructions for the preliminary part   
Description of the task 
You receive a show-up fee of €3, equivalent to 15 points.  We ask you to choose the amount of 
points (between 0 and 15 points, included) that you are willing to invest on a risky asset.  You 
keep the points that are not invested.  
 
The investment 
There is a 50% chance that the investment is a success.  
If the investment is a success, you earn 2.5 times the amount that you have invested. 
If the investment is not a success, you lose the amount that you have invested.  
1st example: You invest 0 point.  You earn: (15 –0) = 15 points 
2nd example: You invest 6 points.  If the investment is a success, you earn: (15 – 6) +  (2.5*6) = 
24 points.  If the investment is not a success, you earn: (15-6) + 0 = 9 points. 
3rd example: You invest 15 points. I f the investment is a success, you earn: (15 – 15) +  (2.5*15) 
= 37 points.  If the investment is not a success, you earn: (15-15) + 0 = 0. 
 
How is the success of the investment determined? 
You are required to choose one color, either white or black.  At the end of the session, you will 
have to press a button « random draw » that will appear on your computer screen.  The computer 
program selects randomly one of the two colors. 
If the randomly drawn color is the color you have chosen, your investment is a success.  
If the randomly drawn color is not the color you have chosen, your investment is not a success.  
 
To sum up: You choose now the amount you are willing to invest; then, you choose a color.  At 
the end of the session, after the other parts have been completed, you will press the random 
draw button.  The computer program will inform you whether the investment is a success and the 
amount of your earnings for this part.  This earning will be added to your earnings of the previous 
parts. 
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. Somebody will 
answer your questions in private. You are not allowed to communicate with the other subjects 
throughout the session.  
 
Instructions for the following parts (Distributed after the preliminary stage has been completed) 
       
These instructions explain the next 6 independent parts. Each part consists of 5 independent periods.  In 
each of the 30 periods, you have to make one decision. Your earnings depend on your decisions and of the 
decisions of the 7 other participants in this session. 
At the end of the session, we will draw randomly 2 periods among these parts.  We will compute the 
average of your earnings in points during these two periods and these points will be concerted into Euros.  
The amount of money that you will earn, added to your payoff in the preliminary part, is confidential. 
 36
Somebody who is not aware of the content of the experiment will pay you in cash and in private in a 
separate room. 
 
Decision rules for the 5 periods of the first part 
 At the beginning of each period, you receive an income. Your income can take the value 50, 100, 150, 
or 200 points. Your income is selected among these values by the computer program.  
 We ask you to pay a tax on your income.  This tax rate is 55%.  It is the same for all the participants in 
this session.  The product of the taxes will be used to fund the participants to other experiments. 
To answer this demand, you must report an amount that lies between 0 and the income you have received.  
The 55% tax rate is applied to the amount you have decided to report.  After you have made your choice, 
you must click the OK button on your screen to validate your decision; once you have clicked this button, 
you cannot change your choice anymore.  
 The computer program can control your reported income according to a certain audit probability and 
this audit can entail the payment of a fine.  
Your probability of being audited is determined as follows:  
• If your reported income is among the 4 lowest reported incomes in the room in the current period , the 
audit probability is 65%. Therefore, you have 65 chances out of 100 to have your report audited. 
• If your reported income is among the 4 highest reported incomes in the room in the current period, the 
audit probability is 35%. Therefore, you have 35 chances out of 100 to have your report audited. 
If all the participants report the same income, an average audit probability, equal to 50%, is applied to each 
participant.  
If an audit is conducted and if it reveals that you have reported an amount lower than your actual income, 
you have to pay both:   
1) the tax on your actual income, i.e. 55% of your actual income  
2) and a fine, which is determined as explained below.  
 
Determination of your payoff in each period 
At the end of each period, your net payoff is determined as follows. 3 cases may occur.  
 If your reported income is not audited, the tax rate is applied to the amount you have reported.  Your 
net payoff is determined according to the following formula: 
Net payoff = income – tax  
with tax = 55% of the reported income  
 If your reported income is audited and if it is equal to your actual income, the tax rate is also 
applied to your reported income. Your net payoff is determined according to the following formula: 
Net payoff = income – tax  
with tax = 55% of the reported income 
 If your reported income is audited and if it is lower than your actual income, the tax rate is 
applied to your actual income.   One subtracts from your payoff a fine that is equal to 20% of the tax 
on the income that you did not report.  Your net payoff is determined according to the following 
formula: 
Net payoff = income – tax – fine  
with tax = 55% of the income  
and fine = 20% ?55% (non reported income)? 
Note that the computer program rounds up the decimals when appropriate. 
At the end of each period, you are informed on the following elements: 
- whether your report has been audited or not 
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- the total amount of your tax (including the fine if appropriate) 
- your net payoff. 
You are not informed on the incomes, the reported amounts, and the payoffs of the other participants.  
 
After you have received this information and before proceeding to the next period, we will ask you to 
express your sentiments regarding your audit during the current period.  We first ask you to report the 
intensity of your sentiments when you have been informed on whether you were audited or not, by means 
of a scale graded from 1 (extremely weak sentiment) to 7 (extremely strong sentiment).  Then, you will be 
requested to report the nature of these sentiments, by means of a scale graded from 1 (extremely negative 
sentiment) to 7 (extremely positive sentiment).   
You answers to these questions are not paid.  They have no influence on the rest of the session; in 
particular, they influence neither the determination of your income in the next period, nor your audit 
probability.  We thank you for however paying attention to these questions and to answer them sincerely. 
To sum up: you receive an income.  You choose the amount that you are willing to report. Depending on 
whether you are among the 4 highest or the 4 lowest reported incomes, your audit probability differs. Then, 
you are informed on your audit, your total tax, and your payoff. Last, you answer the questions regarding 
your sentiments. 
At the end of each period, once all the participants have answered, a new period starts automatically.  You 
receive a new income at random and you make a new report. Each period is independent on the previous 
ones. 
Decision rules for the 5 periods of the second part  
 
The next part also consists of 5 periods.  The decision rules are exactly the same as in the first part.  The 
only difference between the first and the second parts is that if your reported amount is audited and if it is 
lower than your actual income, your picture will be displayed both on the computer screen of other 
participants in the session and on your own screen.  
Similarly, you can receive the picture of another participant in the session who has been audited and who 
has reported a lower amount than his income, except if you have to pay a fine yourself.  Indeed, only one 
picture can be displayed on each screen.  This does not mean that only one participant has been audited and 
fined.  But if you are audited and fined, you are sure that your picture is displayed in the room.  If no 
picture appears on your screen, this is because nobody has been audited or because the reported incomes 
corresponded to the actual incomes. 
The next parts  
 
Each of the next 4 parts also consists of 5 periods.  We alternate the rules of the first and of the second 
parts.  The only difference between the parts depends on the display or not of the pictures of the 
participants who have been audited and fined.  In other words, the pictures can be displayed during the 
even parts (2, 4, and 6); the pictures are never displayed during the uneven parts (1, 3, and 5).  
You are always informed of the current part number and on the possible picture display.  
_______________ 
 
End of the session 
 
At the end of the 6 parts, we will ask you again a series of questions about your sentiments.  We thank you 
for answering these questions sincerely.  
Then, we will draw the two periods that will determine your earnings for these six parts. 
Last, you will draw yourself the color that will determine your payoff for the investment decision you have 
made during the preliminary part.  
---- 
We invite you to read these instructions again with attention.  If you have questions regarding these 
instructions, please raise your hand.  We will answer your questions in private.  
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We thank you for answering the questionnaire that is now distributed, in order to train yourself with the 
determination of payoffs. During the session, the computer program will make all the calculations.  
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